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STANDING, SPENDING, AND SEPARATION: HOW THE
NO-ESTABLISHMENT RULE DOES (AND DOES NOT)
PROTECT CONSCIENCE
RICHARD W. GARNETr*

I.

T

HE First Amendment's "Establishment Clause"-or, its "nonestablishment norm"'-is widely thought to protect "conscience." Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote, for example, in Lee v. Weisman,2 that "[a] statecreated orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience
3
which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed."
The no-establishment rule, he suggested, removes this "risk" to the freedom of "conscience" by prohibiting the imposition or enforcement of
such "orthodoxy." 4 More recently, Justice David Souter observed that the
Establishment Clause's presumed ban on public spending in direct sup5
port of religion "translated into practical terms the right of conscience."
And, in her new book, Liberty of Conscience, Professor Martha Nussbaum
contends that our constitutional tradition has been animated by, among
other things, a "Respect-Conscience Principle," which itself requires an additional "principle" of "Nonestablishment." 6 Many more illustrations are
available, but the basic points are clear and, I suspect, noncontroversial:
The Establishment Clause, many believe, safeguards conscience; the fact
that it does is, many believe, a justification both for the Clause and for its
energetic judicial enforcement; and the Supreme Court's construction.of
the Clause has been guided, at least in part, by its conclusions about what
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I am grateful to Paul Horwitz,
Steve Smith, and Nicole Garnett for their reactions to, and suggestions for, this
paper, and to Professor Patrick M. Brennan for including me in the program of
the 2009 John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture.
1. The "free exercise norm" and the "nonestablishment norm" are, in Professor Michael Perry's words, the "two principal matrices of the constitutional law of
religious freedom." Michael J. Perry, Wat Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment
Norms Forbid? Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, I U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 549, 550 (2003).
2. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
3. Id. at 592. "One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to statesponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect
that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people."
Id. See generally NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEm-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005).
4. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
5. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
6. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY

OF

CONSCIENCE:

IN

DEFENSE

OF

25 (2008).

(655)
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the well-being of conscience requires. We are not entirely sure what the
liberty of conscience is, means, or requires, but, nevertheless, it is, as Professor Steven Smith has observed, "central to the modern discourse of religious freedom" and, indeed, "to the modern self-understanding
7
generally."
This "modern" centrality is not a recent innovation. It is established
that concern for conscience was at the heart of many Americans' thinking
at the Founding about religious liberty and church-state relations. Indeed,
"liberty of conscience," Professor John Witte has explained, "was the general solvent used in the early American experiment in religious liberty. It
was almost universally embraced in the young republic-even by the most
rigid of establishmentarians." 8 According to Professor Noah Feldman, the
Founding-era commitment to conscience was the "principled reason" for
the proposal and ratification of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. 9
But how does this relationship work? That is, how exactly do-and do
not-the anti-establishment norm and the "separation of church and
state" vindicate the freedom of conscience? Roger Williams famously connected the protection of conscience with the maintenance of a wall between the "Garden" of religious faith and the "Wilderness" of civil power
and public affairs. 10 But again, how exactly does this wall, this separation,
shield conscience against violation?
In my view, the no-establishment rule, correctly understood and well
applied, does indeed promote and protect religious liberty, and does safeguard conscience, but not-or, at least, not only-in the ways we usually
think.
The hero of Professor Nussbaum's Liberty of Conscience is Roger Williams. 1 Williams was the founder of the colony of Rhode Island. He was
a fierce and fiery critic of the "soule rape" of religious persecution, 12 contemptuous of both clumsy and cruel attempts by civil authorities to prop
up or privilege a congenial orthodoxy. He was also, as heroic and pro7. Steven D. Smith, InterrogatingThomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience, 1
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 580 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, Conundrums of Conscience].
8. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 39 (2000).
9. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 20; see also WITrE, supra note 8, at 48.
10. See MARK DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); cf Steven D.
Smith, Separation and the Fanatic,84 VA. L. REV. 213, 216 (1999) [hereinafter Smith,
Separation and the Fanatic] ("Roger Williams

turns

out to be an outspoken advocate

of freedom of conscience and church-state separation ....[b]ut Williams's version
of separation is not something with which current separationists will be happy.").
11. See NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 37. For a helpful
study of Williams, see, e.g., TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE:
ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998); Smith, Separation and the Fanatic,

supra note 10 (reviewing HALL, supra).
12. See NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 6,at 37.
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phetic figures often are, reasonably regarded by many as a smug crank and
a tiresome nuisance.
Another venerated (and misunderstood) hero of conscience-who,
as it happens, does not have a role, or even a mention, in Professor Nussbaum's account-is St. Thomas More, the friend and chancellor to King
Henry VIII, one of the most renowned humanist intellectuals of his day,
and-according to Samuel Johnson-"the person of the greatest virtue
that [the British] islands ever produced." 13 More went to his death-citing "conscience"-for refusing to endorse either the King's casting aside
of his long-suffering wife, Catherine of Aragon, or his claim to supremacy
over the Church in England. More, it can be said, died for the principle
of church-state separation, as he understood it. Friends and family alike
pleaded with him to go along, "for friendship's sake," 14 and to take the
oaths that so many clergy and co-religionists had apparently found less
burdensome than prison or death. But he refused. "I would . . . leave

every man to his conscience," he told his daughter, Margaret, "and me
thinketh in good faith that so were it good reason that every man should
leave me to mine." 15 He died, as he said, "the king's good servant, but
God's first."' 6 (Actually, "and God's first.")17
Now, most of what most of us know-or think we know-about More
comes from Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons.1 8 For Bolt, More is not so
much a pious son of Rome-let alone an enthusiastic scourge of Protestant heretics-but a "hero of selfhood." 19 Indeed, what attracted Bolt to
More-it was probably not More's zeal for combating Lutheranism-was
his "adamantine sense of his own self."20 More is-to Bolt, and to many of
us-an exemplar of and martyr for conscience, not because of his resolve
to adhere to what he saw as the "'common faith' of Christendom," 2 1 but
because, as Professor Smith puts it, he was "concerned to remain loyal to
his beliefs, not because he is confident they are true, but because they are
22
his, and hence are constitutive of his very self"
Now, this image of More certainly makes for good drama, and it connects well with the spirit and pieties of our age. It has the disadvantage,
though, of being "almost surely wrong." 23 More could, I suspect, have
13. For a recent and very engaging biography of St. Thomas More, see

PETER

AcKRoYD, THE LirE OF THOMAS MORE (1999).
14. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 72 (1960).

15. Letter from Thomas More to Margaret Roper (Apr. 1534).
16. AcKRoVD, supra note 13, at 405.

17. A THOMAS

MORE SOURCE BOOK

357 (Gerard B. Wegemer & Stephen W.

Smith eds., 2004).
18. BOLT,

supra note 14.

19. See id. at xiv.
20. See id. at xii.
21. Smith, Conundrums of Conscience, supra note 7, at 600 (internal quotations
omitted).
22. Id. at 593.
23. Id.
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happily endorsed Polonius's advice-"to thine own self be true"-as a
helpful life-lesson, but it is quite unlikely that, for him, this maxim captured the demands, aims, and nature of conscience. For More, "conscience was inseparably connected to truth" and its value-the reason it
acshould be honored, and the reason why the political authority should
24
commodate it-was also "connected to the sacred value of truth.
But even if Bolt got More wrong, his play is still compelling, and his
error is instructive. And if, as Professor Nussbaum proposes, Roger Williams's life and example provide a useful point of entry into the contemporary conversation about the American traditions of fairness and equal
respect, the martyrdom of More can help us to better understand how the
no-establishment-of-religion norm, which the Establishment Clause proclaims, does (and does not) serve and help to flourish the freedom of
religious conscience, which the Free Exercise Clause protects.
II.
Before proceeding, a few caveats and reservations: It seems right to
say, again, that the "freedom of conscience" is "central to the modern discourse of religious freedom." 2 5 This centrality has become-as Justice
Robert Jackson memorably declared and as Professor Nussbaum reminds
us-the "fixed star" in our constitutional tradition. 26 Still, it is possible to
venerate and value conscience while at the same time perceiving, and regretting, its "progressive cheapening," perhaps even its "degradation," as
more and more drives, urges, preferences, and desires are baptized in its
waters. 27 As Professor Marie Failinger has written, the freedom of con-

science "began as an argument that government must ensure a free response by the individual called distinctively by the Divine"-or, even
before that, that the individual is duty-bound to adhere freely to the Truth
revealed by God and taught by the Church-but now she says "has come
to mean very little beyond the notion of personal existential decision-mak-

ing." 28 For many, it seems, the "freedom of conscience" is reducible to
"the sacredness of consumer preferences." 29
So, even as we celebrate the freedom of conscience and its protection
under law, we might well wonder if "we have any idea what we are talking
24. See id. at 603.
25. See id. at 580.

26. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
27. See Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Casefor Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REv. 325, 325 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Tenuous Case].
28. See Marie A. Failinger, Wondering After Babel: Power, Freedom, and Ideology in
U.S. Supreme Court Interpretationsof the Religion Clauses, in LAW AND RELIGION 81, 9394 (R. Ahdar ed., 2000).
29. RONALD BEINER, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF LOST SPIRIT: ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY THEORY 29 (1997).
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about,"30 and if we are really talking about the same thing for which More
went to the scaffold and in whose defense Williams charged the Massachusetts Bay Puritans with "soule rape." 31 We might also want to be sensitive
to the possibility, as Professor Philip Hamburger put it, in another context
but with similar purpose, that "more is less," and that by expanding too
much the concept of "conscience," we risk making a platitude of a principle, and make conscience both harder to protect and-as expansively and
imprecisely defined-less worthy of protection.

32

Another, related caveat: There is, in the literature and in the relevant
cases, a longstanding debate over whether the "freedom of conscience" is,
for constitutional purposes, limited to the freedom of religious conscience. 33 In my view, there are solid reasons for believing that respect for
conscience should not be "limited to religiously shaped or informed con34
sciences" or confined to specifically religious questions and contexts.
That said, I am inclined to agree with Professor Smith's observation that
our modern reverence for the freedom of conscience is "parasitic on
older"-indeed, on religious-"ways of thinking that many of those who
invoke conscience today might find problematic." 35 Alasdair MacIntyre,
in After Virtue, famously flagged a similar possibility with respect to the entirety of modern moral discourse. 36 The freedom of conscience, it seems
to me, requires for its foundation a certain "moral anthropology." 37 Cer30. Smith, Tenuous Case, supra note 27, at 326 ("Or are we just exploiting a
venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what 'conscience' is or why it matters?").
31. In Liberty of Conscience, conscience is defined as "the faculty in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning." NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 19.
32. See Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835 (2004).
33. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n one important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of
conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other strongly held beliefs do
not."); see also NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 102-03, 164-74;
Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fairto Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv.
571 (2006).
34. See Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U. CoLo. L. REv. 911, 930 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, What Does Religion
Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience]. See generally ROBERT VISCHER, CONSCIENCE
AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE

(forthcoming).
35. Smith, Tenuous Case, supra note 27, at 358.
36. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).

37. See Richard W. Garnett, American Conversations With(in) Catholicism, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1191, 1216 (2004) ("[B]y 'moral anthropology' I mean 'an account
of what it is about the human person that does the work in moral arguments about
what we ought or ought not to do and about how we ought or ought not to be
treated."' (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and
the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 543 (2003))). In
this same piece, I wrote that
In the Psalmist's words, "Lord, what is man... that thou makest account
of him?" This is not only a prayer, but a starting point for jurisprudential
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tain things need to be true, about the universe, and about the person and
her destiny, in order for it to also be true that "conscience" is not merely
our wants in fancy dress but is instead sacred and therefore capable of
38
making demands on self and society.

IfJohn Searle and other naturalistic thinkers are correct, if the world
"is made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force," 39 some of
which have become organized into "certain higher-level nervous systems," 40 then it is not obvious to me that our conscience-talk has the
moral heft we think it does. If we are merely meat puppets moving
through particle-clogged space, then our "liberty of conscience" story
seems little more than a pretty fiction, and our present-day defenders of
that liberty are doing little more than "whistling in the dark, .

.

. trying to

41
make secure to reason what reason cannot finally underwrite."

III.
42
That is a gloomy thought, so let's put it aside.

reflection. After all, as John Courtney Murray once observed, "[i] n the
end, every structure of moral doctrine and decision rests on a concept of
the nature of man." All moral problems are anthropological problems,
because moral arguments are built, for the most part, on anthropological
presuppositions.
Garnett, supra (citations omitted).
38. A similar point has been made in recent years regarding the morality of
human rights. See generally NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS
(2007); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Non-Religious Ground?, 54
EMORY L.J. 97 (2005).
39. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 86-87 (1994).
40. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 6 (1995). In a
recent essay, Christian Smith describes the "features of a naturalistic universe":
"There is no divinity, no transcendent natural law, no ultimate spiritual meaning
or destiny that transcends human invention during the blip of cosmic time
humans have occupied. Reality consists of various conglomerations of infinitesimally small particles pulled together by physical forces but which are in constant
state of flux." Christian Smith, Does Naturalism Warrant a Moral Belief in Universal
Benevolence and Human Rights?, in SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION 292, 298 (1. Schloss & M. Murray eds.,
2009).
41. RAiMOND GAITA, A COMMON HuMANITY: THINKING ABOUT LOVE AND TRUTH
AND JUSTICE 5 (2d ed. 2000) (quoted in Michael J. Perry, Morality and Normativity
(2007), on file with author); cf.Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw,
1979 DUKE L.J. 1229 (1979). Paul Horwitz suggested to me in correspondence that
our talk of conscience can still pack moral heft, "if we believe we may be meat
puppets but aren't sure."
42. Perhaps, Professor Nussbaum has suggested, we ought to welcome the
chance to "put... aside" the thought:
If we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for value as uninteresting or irrelevant to human ethics, as we should, then the news of its
collapse will not change the way we think and act. It will just let us get on
with the business of reasoning in which we were already engaged.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About PracticalReason in Literature and the Law, 107
HARv.L. REv. 714, 740 (1994). On the other hand, there is Nicholas Wolterstorf's
observation:
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The "freedom of conscience"-whatever it might owe, foundationally,
to a worldview that we no longer accept (or are not willing to admit we
accept)-just is central to our understanding of religious liberty and to the
construction of our First Amendment; it is a fixed star in our constitutional tradition. It is, as Professor Witte has shown, one of the several related and reinforcing "essential rights and liberties of religion" cherished
by the Founding generation, 43 the "cardinal principle for the new experiment in religious liberty." 44 Others included, Professor Witte argues, the
"separation of church and state" called for the "disestablishment of
45
religion.
What, again, do these latter ideas and principles have to do with the
liberty of conscience? And, how should we understand and apply these
principles, to best enable them to serve that liberty? How does-and does
not-the Constitution's no-establishment rule protect conscience?
I believe that an underappreciated answer to this last question can be
found in the martyrdom of St. Thomas and the usurpation by Henry VIII.
Although Roger Williams was certainly no fan of the Roman Catholic
Church or things "popish," he should have regarded Henry's assertion of
supremacy over the Church, his suppression of the monasteries and confiscation of the Church's property, and his attacks on the independence of
ecclesiastical law as brutish invasions of the "Garden" by the master of the
"Wilderness." Just as St. Thomas feared, after Henry's power grab, few
were able to "stand upright," in conscience, in "the winds that blew" once
the powers competing with the sovereign were cut down. 4 6 This is because
the "separation of church and state" is a powerful structuralprinciple; it is a
principle of pluralism, of multiple and overlapping authorities, of competing loyalties and demands. It is a rule that limits the state and thereby
clears out and protects a social space, within which persons are formed
and educated, and without which the liberty of conscience is vulnerable.
And so, it turns out that the no-establishment rule protects the liberty of
conscience primarily by respecting and protecting the independence of
non-state authority.
Before fleshing out this claim, it makes sense to consider other waysmore familiar ways, perhaps-that we might think church-state separation
and non-establishment shore up the liberty of conscience. First, and most
Our moral subculture of rights is as frail as it is remarkable. If the secularization thesis proves true, we must expect that the subculture will have
been a brief shining episode in the odyssey of human beings on earth. A
melancholy conclusion ... if one believes the secularization thesis[.] I do
not believe the thesis.
WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 38, at 393.
43. WIrr, supra note 8, at 39-42.
44. Id. at 42.

45. Id. at 48-58.
46. See BOLT, supra note 14, at 65-66. I discuss this passage in more detail in
Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841 (2001).
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obviously, we could say, as Justice Kennedy did in the graduation-prayer
case, that the First Amendment does not permit coerced prayers or professions of faith. 4 7 Certainly, we should say this. The Declaration on Religious Freedom promulgated by the Second Vatican Council put the matter
plainly and well: The freedom of religion, to which the human person has
a right, grounded in his or her dignity, means "that all men are to be
immune from coercion." 48 It is not at all clear, however, that this no-coer49
cion rule depends in any significant way on the non-establishment norm.
True, a state with a legal establishment of religion might well be more
likely to attempt to coerce people in matters of conscience. It might, however, just as well refrain from such attempts. In any event, in our own
context, the Constitution's Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses seem to
more obviously and directly forbid "coercion" in such matters.
Second, we might think-with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for example-that the no-establishment rule protects and respects conscience by
prohibiting actions by government that "endorse" religion and thereby
"send a message to non-adherents that they are not full members of the
political community." 50 This idea is often at work in cases and controversies surrounding public displays and monuments-the Ten Commandments, 51 for example, or a holiday display. 52 As Professor Nussbaum
observes in her book, these cases can be difficult, and the messages such
displays and symbols communicate might, in some cases, be in tension
with a deep commitment to political and civil equality. 53 At the same
time, these cases are some distance removed from threats to, or the liberty
of, conscience. There are, certainly, many good reasons-civic-friendship
reasons-to worry, in a pluralist society, about clunky or insulting endorsements of religion (just as there are reasons to worry about excessive hostility or sensitivity to religious expression in the public square or to official
acknowledgment of religious traditions). But the policing of displays,
monuments, declarations, and the like for suggestions of favoritism or endorsement is a judicial activity that protects conscience-if at all-only
indirectly.
47. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
48. See SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIs HuMANAE [DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM] 1 2 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_

councils/ii vatican-council/documents/vat-iidecl_19651207_dignitatishumanae-en.html [hereinafter DIGNiTATIs HUMANAE].
49. Cf NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 225 (noting, as one

"danger" posed by religious establishment, "danger of coercion, as an official religion or religions might curtail the conscience space of those who don't join in").
50. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,concurring);
see also, e.g., NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supranote 6, at 227 ("Government
must not make statements ...that a reasonable observer could construe as saying
that a given group of citizens is ranked above another group.").
51. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 746 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. 671-72.
53. See NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 224-72.
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Third, some believe that the Establishment Clause protects conscience
by limiting so-called "morals legislation," and by requiring that all laws
passed and demands made by the civil authority have a "secular purpose,"
rather than a religious one. 54 Justice John Paul Stevens, for example, has
often suggested that laws regulating abortion, or laws outlawing physicianassisted suicide, are unconstitutional because they involve the imposition
5
of "religious" beliefs and therefore burden the freedom of conscience. 5
Similarly, as the debates over and reactions to California's Proposition 8
illustrated, some believe that resistance to the legalization of same-sex
marriage is in tension with the no-establishment rule-and so also with
our commitments to conscience and equal liberty-because the bases for
56
this resistance sound in religious teaching, rather than public reason.
Now, there are good reasons-indeed, there are religious reasons, entirely orthodox ones-to avoid overreaching when it comes to morals legislation. 57 It was not just John Stuart Mill, but also St. Thomas Aquinas,
who believed that the law should not require every virtue or outlaw every
vice. It is, for example, "black letter" Roman Catholic teaching that the
law ought to allow the greatest space possible for freedom, even when that
freedom is not exercised in accord with moral truth, consistent with the
just demands of public order. 58 "As much state as necessary, as much freedom as possible," is howJohn Courtney Murray once put it. 59 That said, it
is a mistake to tie the morals-legislation debate too closely to church-state
separation. Disestablishment and an appropriate distinction between ecclesiastical and political authority do not limit the kinds of reasons that
citizens and legislators may deploy when debating the proper use of the
police power. There are, indeed, moral limits on morals legislation, but
the conversation about those limits is more about justifiable constraints on
liberty than the implications or content of the Establishment Clause.
54. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (applying secular-purpose rule and invalidating state law dealing with teaching of evolution).
55. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens.,J., dissenting) ("I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for
the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.").
56. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Democracy, Religion, and Proposition 8, THE HUFFINGTON POST, May 17, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/
democracy-religion-and-pr_b_144103.html.
57. See, e.g., Gregory A. Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessonsfor
U.S. ConstitutionalLaw from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDIsc.

L.J. 1 (2006).

58. See generally, e.g., Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II, John Courtney Murray,
and the Relationship between Civil and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposalfor Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 231 (2004).
59. John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of State Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 155, 158 (1951); see a/soJohn Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of Religious
Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 521, 521 (1964) ("Let there be as much freedom,
personal and social, as is possible; let there be only as much coercion and constraint, personal or social, as may be necessary for public order.").
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Fourth, financial support by the government for religion is often said
to violate the conscience of those who are compelled to contribute,
through taxes, to the public purse. ThomasJefferson put the matter memorably and influentially: "[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and
tyrannical." 60 A similar view motivated Jefferson's collaborator, James
Madison, to pen his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-

sessments, and to insist that conscience is offended by any law that would
"force a citizen to contribute three pence ...
61

for the support of any one

establishment."
The claim that the no-establishment rule protects the liberty of conscience by regulating the disbursement of public funds is and has long
been attractive and rhetorically powerful. It is, however, mistaken. The
no-establishment rule does protect and nurture the formation and freedom of conscience, but in a different way, one that a recent 54 decision by
the Supreme Court can help us to appreciate.
IV.
Two years ago, in Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion Foundation,62 the Court,
in Linda Greenhouse's words, "closed the courthouse door on a lawsuit
challenging the Bush administration's use of taxpayer money to support
its Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives." 63 Should the "door"
have been open to this challenge? Certainly, whether public funds may
and should be used to pay for social-welfare services provided by religiously affiliated institutions is an interesting, important, and difficult question. The answer provided by the Justices in Hein was that the
Constitution did not authorize the Court to hear this particular challenge,
brought by this particular challenger, because the Freedom from Religion
Foundation ("Foundation") lacked "standing." 64 In other words, the Hein
case was (or, at least, purported to be) more about the Court's power to
decide a legal question than about the answer it should give.
To oversimplify: It is, for better or worse, well established that federal
courts may not-not merely because it is awkward or inconvenient, but
because they really may not-use the 'judicial power of the United
States" 65 to ponder engaging hypotheticals or solve moot court riddles.
Instead, as Justice Stevens has put it, "[t]he Constitution limits federal60. Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1779).
61. James Madison, Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments 1 3
(1785), reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE 59-60 (J.F. Maclear ed.,
1995).

62. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
63. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Suit on FederalMoney for Faith-Based Office,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/washington/
26faith.html?pagewanted=print.

64. Hein, 551 U.S. at 599-609.
65. U.S. CONST. art. III.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss4/7
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court jurisdiction to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" 6 6 Still, many worry that,
if courts focus too much on the plaintiff, and not enough on her complaint, some important problems will go unsolved and some wrongs will go
un-righted, at least in the courts. 6 7 "'If no one has standing to call [the
government] to account,'" the fear is, "'it can disregard the law with impunity-a result that would make an ass of the law."' 68 In Hein, for example,
the Foundation warned of the possibility that, enabled by too-restrictive
standing rules, "a federal agency could use its discretionary funds to build
a house of worship" or "to make bulk purchases of... crucifixes .

.

. for

use in its offices" and yet evade judicial correction of its constitutional error. 69 And why would we ever take the chance that constitutional error
70

will evade judicial correction?
"[P]erhaps our oldest question of constitutional law," Justice
O'Connor once observed, "consists of discerning the proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States."7 1 Similarly
well pedigreed is the challenge of working out both the "real world" and
doctrinal implications of the fact that our Constitution separates the legislative, executive, and judicial "power[s]," and "vest[s]" them in Congress,
the President, and the federal courts, respectively. 72 We have, in other
words, been wrestling for a long time with "the law governing the structure
of, and the allocation of authority among, the various institutions of the
national government." 73 Behind, underneath, or somehow prior to these
venerable problems of horizontal and vertical structuring is another big
and similarly credentialed question: Mhy? That is, why is "authority" divided-i.e., why did those who composed and ratified the Constitution
divide the authority granted by "We the People"-"between the Federal
Government and the States," and why is the national government's authority allocated as it is?
66. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.

III).
67. Cf, e.g., Schlessinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
227 (1974) ("Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.").
68. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending: The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) (quoting WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER
FORSYrH, ADMINISTRATiVE LAw (7th ed. 1994)).
69. See Hein, 551 U.S at 614.
70. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 112 (1968) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("When the judiciary is no longer 'a great rock' in the storm, as Lord Sankey once
put it, when the courts are [miserly] in the use of their power and reach great
issues only timidly and reluctantly, the force of the Constitution in the life of the
Nation is greatly weakened.") (citation omitted).
71. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). For an important
treatment of the case, and this "oldest question," see generally H. Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993).
72. U.S. CONST. arts. 1I-I.
73. Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any FutureAdministrative Law Course: Separation of Powers and the TranscendentalDeduction, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 885, 885 (2005).
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One plausible answer to this question would be (something like) "to
protect human freedom and promote human flourishing." Certainly, a
political community could, through its constitution, pursue these worthy
ends in a number of ways. It could, for example, charge its government,
explicitly and positively, with providing its members with various material
and other goods. The Constitution of the United States, though-unlike
many others 74 -"is

largely silent on positive rights." 75 A community

could, instead, or in addition, opt to constrain government officials and
lawmakers, using express individual-rights protections, from burdening
the liberties of persons and associations: "No Soldier shall, in time of
76
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,"
77
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," and so on.
Or, it could constitute the government in such a way that its very structure-by itself, apart from any positive welfare-promoting requirements or
negative liberty-protecting constraints-served the above-mentioned goals
78
of freedom and flourishing.
Particularly in recent years, courts and commentators have emphasized the extent to which our Constitution reflects this third strategy. 79 It
is said that our constitutional experiment reflects, among other things, the
belief that the structure of government matters for, and contributes to, the
good of human persons.8 0 "Th[e] constitutionally mandated division of
authority," Chief Justice William Rehnquist once wrote, "was adopted by
the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties." 8' Indeed,
"the promise of liberty," Justice O'Connor suggested, lies in this "tension
74. See generally, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSrITUTION
236-37 (2004) (discussing positive-rights provisions in state constitutions); Mary
Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 524
(1992); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms ofJudicialReview, 82 TEX.
L. REv. 1895, 1898-1908 (2004).
75. A.E. Dick Howard, The Bridge at Jamestown: The Virginia Charterof 1606 and
Constitutionalismin the Modern World, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 9, 13 (2007).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
78. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REv. 693, 699 (1976) (noting that, at Founding, "[I]
imitations were ...placed

upon both federal and state governments in the form of both a division of power
and express protection for individual rights").
79. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1687, 1687 (2004) ("Americans properly revere our Constitution for its protection of individual rights. We tend to overlook, however, that the Constitution
also provides a blueprint for our governmental structure.").
80. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (insisting
that Framers were "convinced... that liberty of the person inheres in structure").
81. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). For a careful examination, and strong defense, of the Court's
decision and premises in Lopez, see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "AGovernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. Rv.
752 (1995). For my own examination of the Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism,"
see Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11-38, 84-94 (2003).
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between federal and state power[.]" 8 2 Similarly, "the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch[.]" 8 3 The
"[s]eparation of powers," in other words, "was designed to implement a
of power in the hands of a single
fundamental insight: Concentration
84
branch is a threat to liberty."
One could go on and on, of course, gathering observations by
Madison and Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Tiebout; expounding on
"checks and balances," subsidiarity, localism, and pluralism; and compiling imposing citation lists in support of the proposition that our Constitution was designed to protect individual liberty by dividing, enumerating,
and reserving governments' powers and authority. There is no need, however, to belabor the point: "The genius of the American Constitution lies
in its use of structural devices to preserve individual liberty." 85 And, this
particular feature, or "genius," of our Constitution suggests an interesting,
possibly illuminating, way of thinking not only about the decision in Hein,
but also about the relationship between nonestablishment and the liberty
of conscience.
In Hein, again, the Justices considered a relatively narrow question:
whether the Foundation-a group of people "opposed to government endorsement of religion"-had standing to challenge, on Establishment
Clause grounds, certain activities of the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives. 8 6 As Justice Samuel Alito observed, writing for
a three-Justice plurality, " [ t] he only asserted basis for standing was that the
individual respondents are federal taxpayers who are 'opposed to the use
of Congressional taxpayer appropriations to advance and promote religion.'"87 Now, generally speaking, it is not enough to satisfy the Constitution's standing requirement 88 that a would-be party seeking to challenge
in federal court the constitutionality of a federal-government action pays

82. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
83. Id. at 458.
84. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Metro.

Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252, 272 (1991) ("The ultimate purpose of [the] separation of powers is to protect
the liberty and security of the governed.").
85. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1155 (1992).

86. See Hein v. Freedom of Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 595 (2007).
87. Id. at 596 (quoting appellant's petition for certiorari).
88. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 63-64
(1997) ("Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the [Constitution's] case or
controversy requirement.") (citations omitted).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

13

Villanova
Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 7
VILIANOVA LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 54: p. 655

taxes.8 9 In Flast v. Cohen,90 though, the Justices announced a "narrow ex-

ception to the general rule against federal taxpayer standing," and the
Foundation sought to take advantage of this exception. 9 1
The Foundation contended in its lawsuit that President Bush and
others had violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by giving
"speeches that used 'religious imagery' and praised the efficacy of faithbased programs in delivering social services." 92 In addition, the Office organized conferences whose content "sent a message to religious believers
'that they are insiders and favored members of the political community'
and... to nonbelievers that 'they are outsiders' and 'not full members of
the political community.'"93 The Justices did not reach the merits of the
Foundation's First Amendment claims, though, because they concluded
that it was not entitled to the benefit of the F/ast exception.
In something of a change from recent, high-profile church-state
cases, the dispute in Hein produced only four opinions.9 4 Justice Alito
announced the Court's judgment, in an opinion which was joined only by
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Kennedy. "'No principle,'" he insisted, "'is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.'"95 He refused, therefore, to extend
the Flast exception to reach the Foundation's claims. ForJustice Alito, any
expansion of F/astruns the risk of "deputiz[ing] federal courts as 'virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action." 9 6 That, "most emphatically, 'is not the role of the judiciary.'" 7
The Court did not, however, abandon Flast. The Establishment
Clause, Justice Kennedy insisted in his concurring opinion, "expresses the
Constitution's special concern that freedom of conscience not be compromised by government taxing and spending in support of religion" and, he
89. See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 ("As a general matter, the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to the kind of redressable 'personal injury' required for
Article III standing."); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
90. 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
91. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 593 (citing FRast, 392 U.S. at 88).
92. Id. at 592 (quoting appellant's petition for certiorari).
93. Id. at 595-96 (quoting appellant's petition for certiorari).
94. See, e.g., Rehnquist Praisedfor Service to Court, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-04-rehnquist-x.htm (reporting that, after Chief Justice Rehnquist announced litany of separate opinions in
one of Ten Commandments cases handed down that day, he said, "I didn't know
we had that many people on our court").
95. Hein, 551 U.S. at 598 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))
(internal quotations omitted).
96. Id. at 612 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
97. Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 760).
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stated, it is this concern that justifies the "result reached in F/ast," which
was "correct and should not be called into question." 98
Justice Antonin Scalia, however, was less impressed. For him, a review
of the taxpayer-standing precedents confirmed his grim diagnosis: Fast itself was confused, and "[c]oherence and candor have fared no better" in
its progeny.9 9 In his view, the case's rule must, in logic, be either expanded or rejected. 10 0 That said, Justice Scalia was also unimpressed with
the arguments advanced by the Foundation for extending Fast. The "logical consequence" of these arguments-that is, that "[a] ny taxpayer would
be able to sue whenever tax funds were used in alleged violation of the
Establishment Clause"-"finds no support in this Court's precedents or
our Nation's history."' 0 1
Justice Souter dissented pointedly, and emphasized the "deep historical roots" of the claim that an objecting taxpayer is injured when public
funds are spent in aid of religion. 10 2 After all, Madison had asserted that
the just government of a free people will not "force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment"
of religion. 10 3 This assertion was a "translat[ion] into practical terms [of]
the right of conscience," which dictates, among other things, that "[t]he
Religion... of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate."1 0 4 And, Justice Souter insisted, "[a]s a historical matter, the protection of liberty of conscience may well have been the central objective
105
served by the Establishment Clause."
98. Id. at 616 (Kennedy,J., concurring); cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 59192 (1992) (noting that "lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate
and coerce").
99. Hein, 551 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 628 ("[T] here are only two logical routes available to this Court.
We must initially decide whether Psychic Injury is consistent with Article III. If it is,
we should apply F/ast to all challenges to government expenditures in violation of
constitutional provisions that specifically limit the taxing and spending power; if it
is not, we should overturn f/ast.').

101. Id. at 632.
102. Id. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (quoting 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES

MADISON

183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt

ed., 1901) (1787)).
104. Id. (quoting

THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,

supra note 103, at 184).

105. Id. (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 n.22 (2002)
(Souter,J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted). In addition to his own dissent in Zelman, Justice Souter also cited here the recent, widely noted work by his

former law clerk, Professor Noah Feldman. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 48 ("The
advocates of a constitutional ban on establishment were concerned about paying
taxes to support religious purposes that their consciences told them not to support."); cf. Richard W. Garnett, "Modest Expectations"?: Civic Unity, Religious Pluralism, and Conscience, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2006) (reviewing FELDMAN, supra
note 3, and KEVIN SEAMus HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG: ENDING THE CULTURE
WAR OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA (2005)).
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The centrality of the taxpayer's right of conscience, and the Madisonian claim that public funding in aid of religion implicates that right,
indicated clearly to Justice Souter that "every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious
institution"; this, he thought, distinguishes Establishment Clause objections from other "generalized grievances."10 6 Flast, Justice Souter conceded, is "in a class by itself,"107 but this fact is explained and justified by
the asserted "Madisonian relationship between tax money and conscience"
and also by the Founders' "pragmatic conviction that individual religious
liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of
1 08
all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions."
Hein was not what many observers seemed.to want or expect, i.e., another headline-grabbing installment in the Supreme Court's Lemon-and"endorsement" jurisprudence. The case went from being billed, early in
the Term, as the year's big church-state case-with the drama of a challenge to the Bush Administration's "God-soaked" policies thrown in for
good measure-to one that, if it was mentioned in the end-of-the-year
round-ups, had to be translated from the register of separation-of-powers
to the more accessible one of separation-of-church-and-state. On the
other hand, it did present another 5-4 split among the Justices, divided
along the familiar, if overhyped, ideological lines. 10 9 And, of course, it
provided a vehicle for the frisson that comes, for some, with watching Jus1 10
tice Scalia tear into one of his philosophical allies.
In addition, Hein raises, yet again, this question: Was Madison right?
Is Justice Souter's view-i.e., that Flast's Establishment Clause exceptionalism is justified because it is necessary to vindicate conscience-plausible?a1 ' Is it true that the direction of even "three pence ... of his property
for the support of any one establishment" invades an individual's personal,
protected liberty of conscience, and therefore conflicts squarely with a basic Founding-era commitment?1 12 It was, Professor Feldman reports,
widely believed that "[c] ompelled taxes to support religion ...

always vio-

late religious liberty, even when the taxpayer does not directly object."'
But, were those who believed this correct?

13

106. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 638 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 116 (Fortas, J., concurring)
("The status of taxpayer should not be accepted as a launching pad for an attack
upon any target other than legislation affecting the Establishment Clause.").
107. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 641.
108. Id. at 643 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
109. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D
423, 431 (2007).
110. See Linda Greenhouse, Even in Agreement, Scalia Puts Roberts to Lash, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/
washington/28memo.html.
111. See Hein, 551 U.S at 637-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
113. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 37.
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Certainly, theirs was not the only view. In 1810, a Massachusetts judge
considering that state's constitutionally authorized tax assessments in support of religion rejected the argument that "when a man disapproves of
any religion ....

to compel him by law to contribute money for public

instruction in such religion or doctrine, is an infraction of his liberty of
conscience[.] " 1 14 Even with the benefit of a quarter-century's time to reflect on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,

this judge insisted that this objection "seems to mistake a man's conscience for his money and to deny the state a right of levying and appropriating the money of the citizens, at the will of the legislature, in which
they are all represented."1 15 The "great error," the judge continued, "lies
in not distinguishing between liberty of conscience in religious opinions
and worship, and the right of appropriating money by the state. The former is an unalienable right; the latter is surrendered to the state, as the
16
price of protection."
Why should we think, even if Madison thought, that the freedom of
conscience is unjustly burdened, and the Religion Clauses therefore violated, simply by the use of public funds raised through taxes to pay for
conferences intended to assist religiously affiliated social-welfare organization in applying for generally available contracts and grants?' 17 After all,
such a situation does not present-not really-an "establishment" of religion like those with which those who ratified the First Amendment, and
debated religious liberty in the late 18th century, were familiar. 118 True,
Jefferson's earlier-mentioned proclamation that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical"' 19 packs a lot of rhetorical weight, but
it is not reflected at all in the reality of politics and government today.
Every taxpayer furnishes money for the "propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves"; indeed, every taxpayer funds all sorts of government actions
to which he has serious objections in conscience. But, as Professor Smith
114. Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 400 (1810), reprinted in
MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARvEy, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 18-22 (2d ed. 2006). The author of Barnes, Theophilus Parsons,
MICHAEL W.

had served as a Massachusetts delegate to the Constitutional Convention.

115.

MCCONNELL ET AL.,

supra note 114, at 21.

116. Id.
117. Cf, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-16 (2002) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (concluding that Cleveland's school-voucher program is unconstitutional because it burdens consciences of those who object to spending public
money in ways that, in effect, support religious instruction).
118. SeeVan Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing original understanding of religious establishments); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious ortho-

doxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty."); MCCONNELL

ET

supra note 114, at 15-16 (discussing various legal features of English
establishment).
119. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for EstablishingReligious Freedom § 1 (1779).
AL.,
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has observed, good explanations simply have not yet been given "for why
the burden on conscience applies when a taxpayer objects ...to expenditures that may benefit religion but not when a taxpayer objects on religious or conscientious grounds to expenditures that run contrary to the
120
taxpayer's beliefs."
There are good reasons to be cautious about public support of religious activities and institutions. 121 The best reason, however, is not because
such support violates taxpayers' "consciences"-it does not. Flast was
wrongly decided, and the no-establishment rule does not protect the liberty of conscience primarily by authorizing taxpayer standing to challenge
disbursements of public funds. 12 2 It does, however, protect conscience in
an important way, a way that connects interestingly with the debate over
"standing" in Hein.
V.

I mentioned earlier that we tend to think, and have long thought,
that there is a connection-a cooperative, supporting one-between the
no-establishment rule, on the one hand, and the flourishing and protection of conscience, on the other. But how, exactly, does this relationship
work? How is this support delivered? The brief discussion above of several
possible accounts was enough to warrant the suggestion that they are, at
least, incomplete. Is a better account available? I think so. It is one that is
illustrated and inspired by the work of John Courtney Murray and by the
Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty.

123

Murray is best known today for his work in grounding the freedom of
religious conscience from government coercion on the dignity of the
120. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, supra note

34, at 913-14 & n.13.
121. See generally, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruptionof Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1831 (2009).
122. To say that F/ast was wrongly decided is not to say that the Justices in Hein
offered persuasive distinctions between the two cases. For a thorough analysis and
critique of Hein see, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., and the Future of Establishment ClauseAdjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REv. 115 (2008). I should also note that Paul Horwitz has
argued recently that an appropriate emphasis on the independence and "sovereignty" of First Amendment institutions should result in generous, Fast-type stand-

ing for taxpayers seeking to "enforce the Establishment Clause" and to "preserve
and maintain the integrity of religious entities as sovereign spheres." Paul Horwitz,
Churches as FirstAmendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARv.C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 79, 130 (2009). I have been heavily influenced by Professor Horwitz's
scholarship. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understandingof the Religion Clauses, 53 ViL.. L. REv. 273 (2008). I did not
have the benefit of Of Sovereignty and Spheres at the time this paper was being prepared, but I hope to engage it with the care it deserves in future work.
123. For an expanded discussion of some of the ideas and claims that follow,
see, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4J. CATH.Soc. THOUGHT 59
(2007).
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human person.' 24 What is sometimes overlooked is his emphasis on one
particular "Great Idea"-the "Freedom of the Church"-as a crucial,
structural protection for conscience. 125 This idea, or principle, of what in
American constitutional law is often called "church autonomy" was not
merely a spin-off of his dignity-based case for immunity from coercion in
matters of religious conscience; it is the linchpin of that argument. Murray insisted that we are not really free if "[our] basic human things are not
sacredly immune from profanation by the power of the state[.] " 12 6 The
challenge, then, is to find the limiting principle that can "check the encroachments of civil power and preserve these immunities"; and, he
thought, " [ w]estern civilization first found this norm in the pregnant principle, the freedom of the Church." 127 This principle supplied, in other
words, what Murray called the "new Christian theorem," namely, that the
Church "stood between the body politic and the public power, not only
limiting the reach of the power over the people, but also mobilizing the
moral consensus of the people and bringing it to bear upon the
power."'1 8 For Murray, it was the freedom of the Church that furnished a
"social armature to the sacred order," within which the human person
would be "secure in all the freedoms that his sacredness demands." 129
He worried, though-as we should-that we are living off the capital
of this idea. We enjoy, embrace, and depend upon its freedom-enabling
effects, but without a real appreciation for or even a memory of what it is,
implies, and presumes.13 0 That which furnishes for us today the "social
armature to the social order," the principle or idea that does the work of
affirming and ensuring that the state is not "all in all," is not the freedom
of the Church, but is instead the freedom of the individual conscience.'1'
In our religious-freedom doctrines and conversations, it is more likely that
the independence and autonomy of churches, or of religious institutions
124. See, e.g.,
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 48, 1 2 ("[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as it is
known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself... [T]he right to
religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person
but in his very nature.").
125. SeeJOHN

COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS

202 (1960) (not-

ing that "freedom of the Church" was a "Great Idea, whose entrance into history
marked the beginning of a new civilizational era").
126. Id. at 204.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 205.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 215 ("On the one hand, modernity has denied (or ignored, or
forgotten, or neglected) the Christian revelation that man is a sacredness, and that
his primatial res sacra, his freedom, is sought and found ultimately within the freedom of the Church. On the other hand, modernity has pretended to lay claim to
the effects of this doctrine . .

").

131. See id. at 206 ("The freedom of the individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed, would supply the armature of immunity to the sacred order, which
now became, by modern definition, precisely the order of the private
conscience.").
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and associations generally, are framed as deriving from, or existing in the
service of, the free-exercise or conscience rights of individual persons than
as providing the basis or foundation for those rights.
The Declaration on Religious Freedom, mentioned earlier, famously af-

firmed the dignity of the human person and the inviolability of the human
conscience, and insisted on immunity from external coercion in matters of
religious belief. However, the Council Fathers did not stop there, and
neither should we. They connected this claim about immunity and inviolability with another one, about the state, and about what Murray called
the "ontological structure of society."1 32 Its definition of religious freedom had, as one scholar has put it, "a public, as well as personal
meaning."133

Only a state with limited and defined powers could acknowledge
that there was a sanctum sanctorum in every conscience where
state power ought not tread. Only a state with no pretensions to
omnicompetence could acknowledge its incompetence in matters theological. Only a state which understood that it existed to
service society could acknowledge the priority and integrity of
the free associations of civil society, including religious
34
associations. 1

The point is worth underscoring: The Declaration's claim is not only
that (though it is that) religious freedom includes both immunity from
coercion in matters of "private" belief and a right to express that belief in
community through worship and otherwise. 135 It is not only that religious
faith and experience have a communal dimension, but also that religious
freedom requires for its flourishing a social structure, and a legal order, in
which the state has constitutionally limited and defined powers and, in a
way, competes with other associations and institutions. More particularly,
it calls for recognition by the state of the freedom of the Church-for
itself, and not simply as a proxy for the religious-liberty rights of individuals. True, the Declaration insists that there is a "harmony" between individuals' "civil right not to be hindered in living their lives according to
their consciences" and the "independence" from state oversight in matters
of religion claimed for the church. 13 6 But again, the freedom to be enjoyed by religious communities is not defended merely as a vehicle for or
incident of individuals' private religious expression. Rather, the "freedom
132. See id. at 199.

133. George Weigel, Lecture, The Moral Foundations of Freedom (Oct. 23,
2000), http://www.cis.org.au/events/acton/acton 2000.pdf.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., DIGNiTATIs HUMANAE, supra note 48, 4 ("Religious communities are a requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.").
136. See id.

13.
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of the Church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations
13 7
between the Church and governments and the whole civil order."
The key point here is that the freedom of the Church is framed as a
structural feature of social and political life-one that promotes and enhances freedom by limiting government-and also as a moral right to be
enjoyed by religious communities. It is not simply an effect or implication
of private, individual claims to freedom of conscience and immunity from
government coercion in matters of religious belief. In Murray's view, the
immunity of conscience from coercion in religious matters depends on,
and is nourished by, church autonomy. He believed, in other words, that
"the protection of... aspects of life from the inherently expansive power
of the state. .. depended historically on the freedom of the Church as an
independent spiritual authority." 13 8 He worried, though, that the modem
tendency was to substitute autonomous individuals' consciences-whose
designated protector would be the liberal state-for the freedom of the
Church as the guarantor of the social space necessary for meaningful pluralism; that modern freedom of religion is attacking its own foundations;
and that, in a way, the immunity of conscience is eating itself.
VI.
Return, now, to the Hein case: There, the Justices in the majority emphasized their view that the Court's standing rules reflect and implement
the Constitution's liberty-protecting, power-checking structural principles.
They held up for our consideration and embrace the basic claim that features of the Constitution's design, no less than litanies of specific prohibitions on particular government actions, protect freedom. This claim, I
believe, is instructive with respect to the question posed at the outset of
this paper, that is, how do the no-establishment rule, and the separation of
church and state, actually protect the liberty of conscience? They do so by
committing us to the idea that there are, and ought to be, multiple, rival
authorities. Protecting and respecting the freedom of conscience requires
protecting and respecting the competing associations, institutions, and authorities that both clear out the space in which conscience is formed and
engage in the formation of consciences. A constitutional state that truly
cherishes the liberty of conscience will allow these non-state formers-ofconscience to flourish, will acknowledge their appropriate independence,
and will not aspire to remake them in its own image.

137. Id.

138. Francis Canavan, S.J., Religious Freedom: John Courtney Murray, S.J and
Vatican II, FAITH AND REASON, Summer 1987, available at http://www.ewtn.com/
library/HUMANITY/FR87203.TXT.
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